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I. INTRODUCTION

Gruesome headlines of hours-old infants discarded and left for dead pepper local
news channels nationwide on almost a nightly basis. Unfortunately, most people are
familiar with the tragic cliché where a prom queen gives birth in the girls’ restroom
only to return a few minutes later to the dance floor. 1 Ohio is not immune to such
tragedies. In June 2009, authorities found a newborn infant dumped in the bushes
outside a Meijer store with its umbilical cord still attached—left, no doubt, by a
terrified mother who did not know where to turn. 2 While the fortunate actions of a
Good Samaritan helped to keep this infant alive, many other stories do not end as
well.3 In another tragic example, one Ohio mother is currently serving life in prison
for putting her infant daughter in a microwave oven, causing her to burn to death. 4
Despite varying locations, the underlying motivation behind such crimes is almost
always the same; the shame and panic can overwhelm a woman unprepared for
motherhood.5 To protect the lives of infants, all states and the District of Columbia
have enacted some version of a safe haven law in the hopes of providing a safe
alternative for new parents contemplating the unthinkable. 6 The laws are geared
1
Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 753, 754 (2006). For example, Melissa Drexler, a New Jersey high school woman,
delivered a six-pound six-ounce baby boy in a bathroom while a high school dance was
occurring, throwing the newborn boy in the trash and rejoining her classmates and dance
festivities. Lynne Marie Kohm, Prom Mom Killers: The Impact of Blame Shift and Distorted
Statistics on Punishment for Neonaticide, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 43, 43 (2002).
Similarly, a 19-year-old woman from New York put her newborn infant in her own bedroom
dresser drawer after wrapping it in plastic. Id. at 44. Another woman delivered her baby while
at the beach, shoved the infant in a duffel bag, and hid the bag in the garage. Id. These stories
show that young women are often so in denial that killing the child is seen “as the only way to
continue the denial and concealment of their pregnancy.” Id. at 48.
2
Randy Ludlow & Dana Wilson, Baby Abandoned Near Meijer Store on Rt. 23, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 9, 2009), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2009/
06/09/delbaby.html.
3

Id.

4

Rita Price, Is Extending the Window of Ohio’s “Safe-Haven” Law Effective?, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Jan. 4, 2009), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2009/01/
05/haven.html. Unfortunately, the horrors of infanticide and attempted infanticide continue to
cause a national media outcry. A baby boy was found in a South Carolina arena toilet in
February 2011. Baby Clings to Life After Being Abandoned in S.C. Arena Toilet, CNN.COM,
(Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/02/07/south.carolina.baby/index.html?iref=allse
arch. His mother allegedly gave birth in the public restroom during a Ringling Brothers and
Barnum & Bailey circus performance. Id.
5

See John Nagy, Reporters Query Begets Safe Havens For Abandoned Infants,
STATELINE (June 1, 2001), http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&la
nguageId=1&contentId=14360.
6

Baby Safe Haven—Abandoned Infant Protection Laws, NAT’L SAFE HAVEN ALLIANCE,
http://www.nationalsafehavenalliance.org/law.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2012).
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towards giving mothers an “anonymous way to safely relinquish their infant without
any legal repercussions” by allowing for the safe abandonment of infants under
specific conditions.7
The Ohio legislature enacted the “Desertion of Child Under 72 Hours Old”
statute in 2001 for much of the same reasons that other similar statutes have been
adopted.8 Just six years later, however, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas held that the statute was unconstitutional and of “no further force and effect.” 9
According to the court, the statute’s guaranteed anonymity provision was in direct
conflict with the juvenile court’s procedural requirement of parental notification of
an abandoned child.10 The court’s reading of the statute negates one of the most
critical aspects of all safe haven laws by taking away the mother’s right to not
withhold her identity.11
This Note discusses the conflict between the statewide safe haven law and the
Ohio juvenile rules regarding procedure. It purports that to protect the rights of new
mothers and retain the essential element of anonymity, Ohio’s Juvenile Rule 1(C)
needs to be amended to maintain the state’s current safe haven law. Therefore,
because of the statewide threat Ohio courts place on Ohio’s safe haven law, Juvenile
Rule 1(C) needs to explicitly provide for an additional exception in cases of child
relinquishment.
Section II of this Note discusses the beginning of state safe haven legislation and
what the laws are attempting to prevent. Section III provides fundamental and
common characteristics of safe haven laws. Section IV closely examines the current
Ohio safe haven provision. Section V analyzes the conflict between the safe haven
law and state juvenile procedural provisions. Section VI argues the importance of the
anonymity requirement within Ohio’s safe haven law. Section VII expands upon
valid criticisms of the safe haven law. Section VIII then proposes an amendment to
Juvenile Rule 1(C) to retain the right of anonymity as currently found in Ohio’s safe
haven law. Finally, Section IX provides concluding remarks on the future of Ohio’s
safe haven statute and its anonymity provision within the larger context of safe
haven legislation throughout the country.
II. THE BEGINNING OF STATUTORY PROTECTION
A. Neoanticide and Infanticide: Preventing Maternal Crimes
The sensationalized media attention surrounding infants abandoned by their
mothers and left for dead seems to stem from most people’s inability to understand

7
Ian M. Bolling, Adoption Trends in 2003: Infant Abandonment and Safe Haven
Legislation, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, www.ncsconline.org/WC/.../KIS_Adopt_Trends0
3Haven.pdf.
8

OHIO JUV. L. § 29:12 (2011).

9

In re Baby Boy Doe, 880 N.E.2d 989, 991 (Ohio C.P. 2007).

10
11

Id.

Chantal N. Hamlin, A Safe Haven for Nixzmary Brown, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 65,
70 (2009).
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such terrible and seemingly senseless violence. 12 When accounts of mothers who kill
their own children are spread across newspapers and flashed on television screens,
there seems to be an inherent “violat[ion] of our most cherished notions of life,
safety, and trust.”13 That is, society has a difficult time rejecting the prevalent and
comforting “stereotype that universally casts mothers as the altruistic protectors of
their children.”14 While neonaticide and infanticide may be two of the most
unfathomable crimes, they occur across the country with surprising regularity. 15
Infanticide is the crime of killing an infant, usually under the age of one. 16
Neonaticide, on the other hand, is typically defined as “the murder of an infant
within the first twenty-four hours of life.”17 Interestingly, infanticide—since its
earliest inception—has only applied to women who kill their own children and not
fathers who may be guilty of a similar homicide. 18 Additionally, psychiatrists have
12

Sanger, supra note 1, at 754 (discussing tragic examples in which the media seized upon
the rarity of a child’s abandonment); see, e.g., Ludlow & Wilson, supra note 2; Price, supra
note 4.
13

Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American
Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996). However, Oberman also explains that a longstanding paradox exists in which both ancient and modern societies treated infanticide as a
less atrocious crime than traditional murder. Id. at 5. That is, while traditional notions of
maternal security are shaken when we hear about a mother killing her own child, there has
been a pervasive and almost systematic ambivalence regarding infanticide and how to punish
it. Id. at 48-49. Oberman concludes that the United States, like almost all other Western
societies, differentiates murder from infanticide, oftentimes regarding the latter with
compassion and believing that it to be an uncontrollable impulse. Id.
14

Id. at 4.

15

Id.

16

See id. at 3. While the age of a one-year-old child is generally considered a workable
cut-off point to distinguish infanticide from other forms of maternal killings, this age limit is
completely arbitrary. Id. Oberman argues that there is not really an “established age limit for
victims of this crime.” Id. Additionally, “maternal filicide” is a term used to define the murder
of a child by his or her mother. Susan Hatters Friedman & Phillip J. Resnick, Child Murder By
Mothers: Patterns and Prevention, WORLD PSYCHIATRY, 137 (2007), available at http://w
ww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2174580/pdf/wpa060137.pdf. While parents who
commit neoanticide and infanticide tend to be extremely young teenage girls, women who
commit filicide—which occurs after the first twenty-four hours of the child’s life—“tend to be
older and married, and to have a history of mental illness . . . [they] are frequently psychotic
or depressed . . . and may believe that killing of the child is the only way to alleviate the
child’s suffering or potential suffering.” Kohm, supra note 1, at 49; see, e.g., John Esterbrook,
No Stone Left Unturned, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/
03/03/opinion/main502755.shtml. This Article details the trial of Andrea Yates, who was
found not guilty in the killing of her five children by reason of insanity. Id. Dr. Phillip
Resnick, the defense expert in the case regarding the Yates’ insanity plea, told jurors “not only
did Yates not know right from wrong when she systematically drowned her kids in their own
bathtub, she actually thought she was doing the right thing.” Id.
17

Amy D. Wills, Neonaticide: The Necessity of Syndrome Evidence When Safe Haven
Legislation Falls Short, 77 TEMP. L. REV 1001, 1001 (2004) (citing Phillip J. Resnick, Murder
of the Newborn: A Psychiatric Review of Neonaticide, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1414, 1414
(1970)).
18

Oberman, supra note 13, at 3 n.5.
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recognized that mothers commit nearly all acts of neonaticide. 19 This gender-based
specification between normal homicide and infanticide may be a contributing factor
to the female-centeredness of many states’ safe haven laws. 20
Because most states limit safe haven statutes to apply to infants that are three
days old, the legislation clearly attempts to prevent neonaticide. 21 Sometimes, the
only real unifying characteristic between these desperate women is a severe
psychological illness given the fact that “women who commit neonaticide are of
every age, of every race, ethnicity, and socio-economic class.”22 Psychiatrists have
noted, however, that mothers who commit neonaticide are often young, single, and
stuck with an unwanted pregnancy. 23 Additionally, almost none of the women had a
stable relationship with a male partner when the neonaticide occurred. 24 Most
importantly, there seems to be a strong tendency of isolation among these women, in
an attempt to hide their pregnancies from those closest to them. 25 Given the general
culture of secrecy that permeates through women who commit infanticide and
neonaticide, safe haven laws are even more necessary. An unfortunate number of
these panicked women endure hours of labor alone—suffering from both shock and
exhaustion—and ultimately end up frantically discarding their babies in places like
the trash or the toilet.26 Success will be achieved if only a handful remember hearing
about the protection of their state’s safe haven statute.27
19

Friedman & Resnick, supra note 16, at 137.

20

See Oberman, supra note 13, at 5.

21

State Policies in Brief: Infant Abandonment, GUTTMACHER INST. (May 1, 2012),
www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_IA.pdf.
22

Wills, supra note 17, at 1004 (citing Oberman, supra note 13, at 23).

23

Friedman & Resnick, supra note 16, at 137. According to one scholar, most girls who
commit infanticide and neonaticide are extremely young, averaging only seventeen years of
age and still living with their parents or a guardian. Oberman, supra note 13, at 23. Resnick
also found that mothers who commit infanticide and neoanticide are often depressed and
suffer from ongoing psychosis and sucidial thoughts. Friedman & Resnick, supra note 16, at
137. Five major motives are also often attributed to mothers guilty of such crimes:
(a) in an altruistic filicide, a mother kills her child out of love; she believes death to be
in the child’s best interest (for example, a suicidal mother may not wish to leave her
motherless child to face an intolerable world; or a psychotic mother may believe that
she is saving her child from a fate worse than death); (b) in an acutely psychotic
filicide, a psychotic or delirious mother kills her child without any comprehensible
motive (for example, a mother may follow command hallucinations to kill); (c) when
fatal maltreatment filicide occurs, death is usually not the anticipated outcome; it
results from cumulative child abuse, neglect or Munchausen syndrome by proxy; (d)
in an unwanted child filicide, a mother things of her child as a hindrance; (e) the most
rare, spouse revenge filicide occurs when a mother kills her child specifically to
emotionally harm that child’s father.
Id.
24

Oberman, supra note 13, at 24.

25

Id.

26

Oberman, supra note 13, at 25.

27

See id.
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B. Texas’ Baby Moses Law
Safe haven laws are a relatively recent development on the legal scene, only
coming into existence within the last fifteen years. 28 America’s first safe haven law
was enacted in Texas in 1999, following a twelve-month period in which thirteen
newborn babies were found discarded in dumpsters or on doorsteps.29 The
legislation’s sponsors argued that a safe haven statute would lower the occurrence of
such tragic events in the future.30 Texas’ safe haven legislation was introduced as
House Bill 3423 by Representative Geanie Morrision and enacted into law on July
15, 1999.31 The law provided that an infant up to thirty days old could be left with a
designated emergency medical provider by the mother without being prosecuted for
abandonment or neglect.32 Additionally, the statute provided mothers with an
affirmative defense to prosecution of child abandonment or neglect charges. 33
Finally, while not a provision of the original Texas statute, mothers are currently
guaranteed the right to remain anonymous when leaving their children. 34 The statute
states that a “designated emergency infant care provider has no legal duty to
ascertain the parent’s identity and the parent may remain anonymous. However, the
parent may be given a form for voluntary disclosure of the child’s medical facts and
history.”35
28

See Sanger, supra note 1, at 754 (indicating that since 1999, forty-six states have
enacted Save Haven Legislation).
29

Id. at 775.

30

Cynthia Dailard, The Drive to Enact “Infant Abandonment” Laws—A Rush to
Judgment?, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUB. POLICY, 1 (Aug. 2000), http://www.gutt
macher.org/pubs/tgr/03/4/gr030 401.pdf.
31

Kimberly M. Carrubba, Background Paper 01-3: A Study of Infant Abandonment
Legislation, LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, 80 (Dec. 2000), http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/
Research/Publications/Bkground/BP01-03.pdf
32

Id. The current Texas statute provides that:

a designated emergency infant care provider shall, without a court order, take
possession of a child who appears to be 60 days old or younger if the child is
voluntarily delivered to the provider by the child's parent and the parent did not
express an intent to return for the child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.302(a) (2011).
33

Carrubba, supra note 31, at 71.

34

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.302(b) (2010).

35

Id. In addition to section (a) above, the Texas statute, Accepting Possession of Certain
Abandoned Children, reads:
(b) A designated emergency infant care provider who takes possession of a child
under this section has no legal duty to detain or pursue the parent and may not do so
unless the child appears to have been abused or neglected. The designated emergency
infant care provider has no legal duty to ascertain the parent's identity and the parent
may remain anonymous. However, the parent may be given a form for voluntary
disclosure of the child's medical facts and history.
(c) A designated emergency infant care provider who takes possession of a child
under this section shall perform any act necessary to protect the physical health or
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Since the passage of Texas’ safe haven law, legislatures nationwide continue to
recognize the value and necessity of protecting the rights of the mothers who
relinquish their children. The popularity and practical appeal of the Texas safe haven
law was immediate. Within a year or two of its promulgation, thirty states introduced
similar bills and fourteen states already had laws in place. 36 As early as September
2001, at least twenty-four states did not require the mother relinquishing her child to
disclose any personal information about herself or her child to authorized
personnel.37 By February 2011, the number of state statutes that explicitly required
anonymity to be provided to the relinquishing mother increased to thirty-four states
and the District of Columbia.38
C. The Disaster of Nebraska’s 2008 Safe Haven Legislation
Nebraska is the most recent state to enact a safe haven law. 39 Nebraska’s
lawmakers struggled for over seven years before finally passing a statute. 40 When
Governor Dave Heineman passed Legislative Bill 157 in February of 2008, it was
the most encompassing and complex safe haven act of any state. 41 While Nebraska
originally intended its safe haven statute to reflect current trends regarding
abandoned infant laws, arguments within the legislature over the age limit caused
Legislative Bill 157 to be enacted without a restriction on the age of the relinquished
child.42
safety of the child. The designated emergency infant care provider is not liable for
damages related to the provider's taking possession of, examining, or treating the
child, except for damages related to the provider's negligence.
36

Dailard, supra note 30, at 1.

37

Nina Williams-Mbengue, State Legislative Report: Safe Havens for Abandoned Babies,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Sept. 2001), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-servic
es/ncslnet-state-legislative-report-safe-havens-for.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2012). In addition
to states providing an express anonymity guarantee, a number of states implicitly provided for
anonymity. In these states, medical workers are obligated under the statutory provisions to at
least ask the parent to provide information about the infant; however, parents are still allowed
to refuse. Id.
38

GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 21.

39

Erik Eckholm, Older Children Abandoned Under Law for Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/us/03omaha.html.
40
Diane K. Donnelly, Symposium: How Far Have We Come Since 2000?: Nebraska’s
Youth Need Help—But Was a Safe Haven Law the Best Way?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 771, 774
(2010).
41

Hamlin, supra note 11, at 65; Donnelly, supra note 40, at 774; Safe Haven Law, NEB.
DEP’T. HEALTH HUMAN SERV., http://dhhs.ne.gov/children_family_services/Pages/children_fa
mily_services_safehaven.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). Legislative Bill 157, proposing the
enactment of a safe haven law in Nebraska reads as follows: “No person shall be prosecuted
for any crime based solely upon the act of leaving a child in the custody of an employee on
duty at a hospital licensed by the State of Nebraska. The hospital shall promptly contact
appropriate authorities to take custody of the child.” Id.
42
Donnelly, supra note 40, at 775-76. Nebraska state legislators were apparently
concerned with emergency medical workers’ ability to discern whether the infant was under
the proposed seventy-two hours or thirty-days old. Id.
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On September 1, 2008, a teenager relinquished her child at a police station,
causing almost immediate national outrage with the expansive Nebraska safe haven
law.43 The outrage was exacerbated before the end of September, as four more
children—between the ages of eleven and fifteen—were abandoned.44 The most
shocking account, following the passage of Nebraska’s safe haven law, came when a
widowed father surrendered nine of his ten children, the oldest being seventeen years
old, and claimed that he simply could not continue to care for them. 45 Before the safe
haven statute could be amended,46 a total of thirty-six older children and teenagers
were relinquished under the statute, while no infants were relinquished. 47 The 2008
Nebraska situation seems to indicate two things. First, it illustrates the need for all
safe haven laws to follow some variance of the time-tested structure enacted by
states since the birth of Texas’ safe haven statute. That is, while a common age limit
of seventy-two hours or thirty days may seem arbitrary, it “appropriately captures
that specific concern for infants [as] a fundamental component to any safe haven
law.”48 Second, and most importantly, the crisis “cast a spotlight on the hidden
extent of family turmoil in the country and what many experts say is a shortage of
respite care, counseling, and especially psychiatric services to help parents in dire
need.”49 While safe haven laws may not be able to remedy the deep societal wounds
surrounding shameful pregnancies stemming from unsupportive families and
communities, they provide a much-needed first step in the fight to protect the lives of
infants.

43

Eckholm, supra note 39.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Upon recognizing the disastrous consequences of not specifying a maximum age
requirement under its safe haven law, Nebraska amended its statute, making it now more
consistent with statutory provisions already in affect. Lucinda J. Cornett, Remembering the
Endangered “Child”: Limiting the Definition of “Safe Haven” and Looking Beyond the Safe
Haven Framework, 98 KY. L.J. 833, 834 (2010). The current safe haven statute in Nebraska
now provides:
[n]o person shall be prosecuted for any crime based solely upon the act of leaving a
child thirty days old or younger in the custody of an employee on duty at a hospital
licensed by the State of Nebraska. The hospital shall promptly contact appropriate
authorities to take custody of the child.
NEB. REV. ST. ANN. § 29-121 (2010).
47

Donnelly, supra note 40 at 776-77.

48

Id. at 777.

49

Eckholm, supra note 39. In addition to bringing attention to the dire economic situation
many parents face, the original Nebraska safe haven statute also shed light on the struggles of
raising a child with a severe mental illness. Mary Carmichael, A Not-So-Safe-Haven,
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.newsweek.com/2008/12/09/a-not-so-safe-haven.prin
t.html. According to the Board President of the Nebraska Family Support Network, many of
the teens that were abandoned during the no-age restriction window suffered from mental
illness and behavioral issues that completely drained their families’ wealth and patience. Id.
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D. The Possibility of National Legislation
With every state recognizing the need for the protection provided by safe haven
laws, the federal government should take notice and act accordingly. Politicians
across the political spectrum, with an interest in a wide array of issues, are publically
supporting safe haven laws. 50 In 2000 and 2007, Congress took a proactive step in
creating a federal law that would offer the same general protections currently
provided at the state level.51 In April of 2000, the House of Representatives
unanimously passed a resolution that, according to Connecticut Republican
Representative Nancy Johnson, would “focus attention and raise awareness of the
problem of newborn babies abandoned in public places.” 52
Indicating that the importance of dealing with infant abandonment crosses party
lines, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, a Democrat from Texas, and nine other
cosponsors introduced the Baby Abandonment Prevention Act the same year as
Representative Johnson’s resolution.53 The Baby Abandonment Prevention Act
sought help from the United States Attorney General in creating a task force to
collect and compile comprehensive data regarding baby abandonment; including
researching what causes mothers to abandon their children in the first place. 54
Following the Bill’s unsuccessful passage in 2000, Representative Lee sponsored
House Bill 259: Baby Abandonment Prevention Act again in 2007. 55 While the Bill
never became law, it reiterated the need “to provide for the establishment of a task
force within the Bureau of Justice Statistics to gather information about, study, and
report to Congress regarding, incidents of abandonment of infant children.” 56
50

Dailard, supra note 30, at 2.

51

Id. at 1-2; see Baby Abandonment Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 259, 110th Cong.
(2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-259.
52

Dailard, supra note 30, at 1-2.

53

Id. at 2.

54

Id.

55

Baby Abandonment Prevention Act of 2007, supra note 51.

56

Id. House Bill 259, entitled Baby Abandonment Prevention Act of 2007 states in full:

[t]o provide for the establishment of a task force within the Bureau of Justice Statistics
to gather information about, study, and report to Congress regarding, incidents of
abandonment in infant children.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
Section 1. Short Title
This Act may be cited as the “Baby Abandonment Prevention Act of 2007.”
Sec. 2. Establishment of Task Force.
(a) In General—The Attorney General, acting through the Director of the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, shall establish a task force (to be known as the Task Force on Baby
Abandonment) to carry out the following:
(1) Collecting information from State and local law enforcement agencies and child
welfare agencies regarding incidents of abandonment of an infant child by a parent of
that child.
(2) Maintaining that information in a comprehensive database.
(3) Studying that information and making findings, conclusions, and
recommendations regarding that information.
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A law similar to House Bill 259 would be an invaluable resource to state
governments and women across the country. It would be a great first attempt at
uncovering and compiling the very information that has eluded lawmakers and
scholars since the late 1990s.57 According to one scholar, “[v]irtually none of the
states studied the infant-abandonment problem prior to passing safe haven laws; they
passed these laws without grappling with the circumstances that might lead a young
woman to abandon her newborn.”58 Congressional resources would give statistical
evidence of the need for America’s safe haven laws and provide a better
understanding of the horrific circumstances surrounding infanticide.
III. KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF SAFE HAVEN LAWS
A. The Relinquishment Process
Safe haven statutes vary from state to state and the intent of each is to ensure a
safe future to infants whose mother may abandon them. 59 The hope is that by
allowing women to leave their babies in a safe location, with no questions asked, the
lives of newborn infants will be saved. 60 For such a complex situation, encompassing
complicated issues of guilt, fear, and anxiety, the general process in which a mother
can give up her child under a safe haven statute is remarkably simple. 61 If a mother
gives birth outside of a hospital, as many young girls in denial of their pregnancy do,

(4) Submitting reports in accordance with this section.
(b) Information Included—The information referred to in subsection (a) shall include
information with respect to the following:
(1) The prevalence of such incidents.
(2) The demographics of such children and such parents.
(3) The factors that influence the decision of such parents to abandon such children.
(4) The circumstances surrounding such abandonments, including the time, place, and
manner of such abandonments.
(5) The outcomes for such children and such parents after such abandonments.
(6) Trends and variations in the matters set forth in paragraphs (1) through (5).
(c) Definition—In this section, the term “infant child” means a child not more than 12
months of age.
(d) Reports—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
annually thereafter, the task force shall submit a report to the Congress detailing its
methodology, findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
Baby Abandonment Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 259, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?bname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h259ih.t
xt.pdf.
57

Michelle Oberman, Comment: Infant Abandonment in Texas, CHILD MALTREAT, 94
(Feb. 2008), available at http://cmx.sagepub.com/.
58

Id. Congress is also guilty of such research oversight; currently, there are no national
statistics regarding the number of babies abandoned each year. Dailard, supra note 30, at 1.
59

Sanger, supra note 1, at 754.

60

Id. at 762.

61

Oberman, supra note 13, at 71.
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they need only take the baby safely into the hands of a designated individual. 62 In
this case, the woman’s safest course of action would be to call 9-1-1 to receive
emergency medical attention for both herself and her child and then leave the infant
in the hands of an EMT, doctor, or nurse upon arriving at the hospital. 63 Beyond
delivering the child to an enumerated individual, a mother is not required to take any
additional steps.64 The mother may choose to leave basic health information to aid in
any medical attention for the child, but she is most often not required to do so. 65 To
encourage mothers to take advantage of these statutes, some states provide hotline
numbers that women may call during their pregnancy to set up an anonymous
delivery at a hospital.66
B. Statistical Insufficiencies Regarding Reports of Infant Abandonment
Due to insufficient reporting techniques, the exact number of infants that are
abandoned each year is unknown.67 The available data estimates that 350 to 20,000
of the 4 million babies born each year are abandoned.68 One legal scholar, Michaelle
Oberman, articulated the difficulty that arises when legislatures or child welfare
organizations attempt to numerically determine the “success” of safe haven laws

62
Ohio’s Safe Haven for Newborns: An Alternative to Leaving Infants in Unsafe Places,
OHIO DEPT. OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, www.odjfs.state.oh.us/forms/file.asp?id=55210
(last visited May 26, 2012).
63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id. In Ohio, the “birth parent is not required to provide any information, including his or
her name. However, it would help the baby if the birth parent chose to provide basic health
information. The birth parent will be offered a form to guide them in providing the most
important health information.” Id.
66

Patricia Wen, Abandoned to Happiness, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2009, available
at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/11/26/for_this_couple_prec
ious_reason_to_be_thankful/. For example, in Massachusetts, women can call a twenty-fourhour hotline (1-866-814-SAFE) to speak with a counselor regarding how to take advantage of
their options under the safe haven statute and safely relinquish their child. Id. Additionally, the
National Safe Haven Alliance provides a toll free crisis hotline (1-888-510-BABY) for
mothers to call and ask questions about their pregnancy and to learn about their states’ safe
haven laws. NAT’L SAFE HAVEN ALLIANCE, supra note 6.
67

Id. For example, as of January 2009, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services
said that sixty-three infants were safely surrendered under the safe haven statute; but the
number of other infants abandoned are unable to be tracked by the Department. Price, supra
note 4. Additionally, the federal government does not provide any enlightening data, as they
currently do not keep track of the number of babies abandoned in public places each year.
Dailard, supra note 30. According to a spokesperson for the Department of Health and Human
Services’ Administration for Children and Families, however, in 1998 over 31,000 infants
were left in the hospital by mothers upon delivery either because they intended to relinquish
the child to authorities or they were not fit to be a parent according to child protective
services. Id.
68
Susan L. Pollet, Safe Haven Laws—Do Legal Havens to Abandon Babies Save Lives?,
32 WESTCHESTER B. J. 71, 71 (2005). This smaller number is likely too low since it does not
take into account discarded infants that were never found or reported to authorities. Id.
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across the country.69 In her Comment: Infant Abandonment in Texas, Oberman
states:
[a]s anyone familiar with these laws long has recognized, they are almost
impossible to evaluate. Designed to redress the problem of neonaticide—a
problem that is shrouded in the secrecy that accompanies concealed
pregnancies and abandoned newborns—the law’s solution is to maintain
the secrets of those who might otherwise endanger their newborns. From
their inception, it therefore was unclear how one would measure the
relative success of safe haven laws . . . [t]o know whether safe haven laws
decrease unsafe infant abandonment, one must know whether the women
who place their children with safe havens are those who would otherwise
have abandoned them unsafely rather than those who might have placed
their children via the traditional adoption system or perhaps have elected
to raise them on their own. In short, one must know their secrets. 70
Since the young mother is often the only one with knowledge of her pregnancy, it
is inherently difficult to determine a yearly abandonment figure. 71
Although the available estimated figures cannot tell the full story of the success
of safe haven statutes, the figures provide a hopeful conceptualization of the statutes.
That is, even though it is impossible to know exactly how many women chose
relinquishment instead of reacting violently out of panic, arguably even one case
where a safe haven was taken advantage of bodes success. But the figures tend to
point to higher rates of success.72 It is estimated that over the past decade, safe haven
laws saved well over 1,000 infants nationwide.73 In addition to the infants saved as a
result of the Texas statute, more than sixty infants were safely relinquished since
Ohio enacted its safe haven law in 2001.74
C. Increased Awareness of the Protections Afforded by Safe Haven Laws
With an increased effort on the part of state government leaders and medical
providers, the awareness amongst troubled women seeking protection for their
unwanted child will continue to grow. 75 Increased awareness in schools, doctors’
offices, and homes about the protections of anonymity and criminal immunity under
safe haven laws is the only way to educate young frightened women and loved ones
around them so they are aware of the warning signs of a concealed pregnancy. 76
69

Dailard, supra note 30, at 1.

70

Oberman, supra note 57, at 94.

71

Jill M. Acklin, Choosing Life: Proposing Immunity for Mothers Who Abandon Their
Newborns, 35 IND. L. REV. 569, 573 (2002).
72

See NAT’L SAFE HAVEN ALLIANCE, supra note 6.

73

Id.

74

Ludlow & Wilson, supra note 2; see also Price, supra note 4 (indicating that as of 2009,
63 babies were surrendered under Ohio’s safe haven statute).
75

Michelle Oberman argues that “[safe haven laws] cannot be effective unless they
become public knowledge.” Oberman, supra note 57, at 95.
76
Id. Oberman suggests that “[t]he best chance of preventing neoanticide lies in
intervention, which occurs when someone in these women’s lives confronts them and offers
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California is on the forefront of education of women’s sexual health issues.
California’s Safely Surrender Baby Law was originally enacted in January 2001. 77
California’s safe haven law became permanent when it was signed by Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger in January 2006.78 Assembly Bill 2817 requires that:
sex education classes to advise pupils of specified provisions of law
relating to parents and others who voluntarily surrender physical custody
of a minor child 72 hours old or younger at a hospital emergency room or
other designated location without being subject to criminal prosecution
for certain crimes.79
Although California’s safe haven law is similar to other traditional safe haven
laws, the statute is remarkable as it requires public schools to advise students about
the state’s statutory protections.80
D. Necessary Elements Comprising All Safe Haven Laws
1. Limited Participation
Despite some slight variances, all safe haven laws contain five key elements that
work together to achieve the aforementioned societal goals. 81 First, each states’ safe
haven law details who can take advantage of the statutory protections and who can
surrender a baby to a safe haven; most states allow both mothers and fathers to
surrender the baby.82 States that recognize the uniquely female crimes of neoanticide
and infanticide only allow post-partum mothers to take advantage of safe haven
statutes;83 but over fifteen states allow another individual, such as a guardian
them a way forward . . . [i]f widely publicized, safe haven laws could place others on notice of
the possibility that someone in their lives might be concealing a pregnancy.” Id.
77

Safely Surrendered Baby Law, CDSS, http://www.babysafe.ca.gov/ (last visited Feb.
14, 2011). In addition to the measures taken by California to promote its safe haven law, New
Jersey funds a public awareness program where the state provides a minimum of $500,000 a
year to encourage the use of its law that permits anonymous infant abandonment. Susan
Ayres, Kairos and Safe Havens: The Timing and Calamity of Unwanted Birth, 15 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 227, 257 (2009). Using a variety of methods, such as television and
radio, the state has attempted to instill the slogan, “No Shame. No Blame. No Names,” into its
citizens. Id.
78

Safely Surrendered Baby Law, CDSS, http://www.babysafe.ca.gov/ (last visited Feb.
14, 2011).
79

Id.

80

A.B. 2817, 2001-2002 Sess. (Cal. 2002), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/
01-02/bill/asm/ab_2801-2850/ab_2817_bill_20020929_chaptered.pdf.
81

Sanger, supra note 1, at 765.

82

Id.

83

Id. Some states, like Georgia and Tennessee, do not allow fathers to relinquish their
children under the safe haven statute, most likely because men rarely kill newborns. Id.; see
also Donnelly, supra note 40, at 785. The Georgia Statute provides that:
[a] mother shall not be prosecuted for the crimes of cruelty to a child . . . contributing
to the delinquency, unruliness, or deprivation of a child . . . or abandonment of a
dependent child . . . because of the act of leaving her newborn child in the physical
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designated by a parent, to relinquish a child under the safe haven statute. 84 Arizona,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, and Minnesota allow
someone other than a parent to relinquish an infant under its safe haven statute. 85
Regardless of the specifics, limiting participation in safe haven statutes is an
important aspect that “implicitly supports the underlying goal of anonymity because
it ensures that no one else needs to know about the baby before the law can be
used.”86
2. Age Restriction
Second, all states limit the amount of time that can pass between the birth of a
child and its surrender under safe haven laws. 87 Currently, fourteen states have a
seventy-two-hour age restriction, including Ohio, and fourteen other states allow
thirty days to pass before the parent must decide whether he or she plans to surrender
the child.88 The age restrictions in both Missouri and North Dakota, however, allow

custody of an employee, agent, or member of the staff of a medical facility who is on
duty, whether there in a paid or volunteer position, provided that the newborn child is
no more than one week old and the mother shows proof of her identity, if available, to
the person with whom the newborn is left and provides her name and address.
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-10A-4 (2012). In addition, Tennessee’s statute permits only mothers to
relinquish their children stating:
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary and without complying
with the surrender provisions of this part, any facility, as defined by § 68-11-255, shall
receive possession of an infant aged seventy-two (72) hours or younger upon the
voluntary delivery of the infant by the infant's mother, pursuant to § 68-11-255.
Tenn. Code. Ann § 36-1-142 (2012).
84

Guttmacher Inst., supra note 38.

85

Id. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623.01 (2012) (providing that either a “parent or agent
of a parent” can voluntarily relinquish an unharmed newborn infant); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17a-57 (2012) (allowing for both parents of the infant and “lawful agent[s]”); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16 § 907A (2012) (“A person may voluntarily surrender a baby directly to an
employee or volunteer of the emergency department of a Delaware hospital inside of the
emergency department, provided that said baby is surrendered alive, unharmed and in a safe
place therein”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 709-902 (2012) (allowing for abandonment for “a parent,
guardian, or other person legally charged with the care or custody of a child”); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 233.3 (2012) (providing for a “parent or other person” to relinquish custody of the
newborn infant); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 553(3) (2012) (“A person is guilty of
abandonment of a child if, being a parent, guardian or other person legally charged with the
long-term care and custody of a child under 14 years of age, or a person to whom the longterm care and custody of a child under 14 years of age has been expressly delegated”); MD.
CODE ANN. § 5-641 (2012) (“If the person leaving a newborn under this subsection is not the
mother of the newborn, the person shall have the approval of the mother to do so”); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145.902 (2012) (allowing for either the mother or “person leaving the newborn”
to take advantage of the safe haven law).
86

Donnelly, supra note 40, at 784-85.

87

Hamlin, supra note 11, at 70.

88

Guttmacher Inst., supra note 38.
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for a full year to pass before the mother is no longer eligible for relinquishment. 89
The time limit ensures that the child can transition smoothly into a loving adoptive
home.90 This rationale is arguably sound when one imagines how difficult it can be
for a one-year-old child to be abandoned by his or her mother, who the child has
already grown to love, and placed in the hands of the county. 91
3. Designated Locations
Additionally, all safe haven laws require that the infant be left in designated safe
haven zones, such as hospitals, fire stations, and police stations. 92 While every state
allows infants to be surrendered to hospitals, some states only allow a hospital to
surrender into the arms of an emergency medical service worker, such as an
emergency room nurse. 93 These locations are commonly used because they are easily
identifiable within the community and open during all hours of day. 94 Some statutes,
however, even allow parents to surrender their children to adoption agencies 95 or
places of worship.96

89

Id. Missouri’s safe haven statute allows for an affirmative defense (as opposed to
outright immunity from prosecution) in situations where the child is one year old. It reads in
pertinent part:
[a] parent shall not be prosecuted. . . for actions related to the voluntary
relinquishment of a child up to five days old pursuant to this section and it shall be an
affirmative defense to prosecution for a violation of . . . that a parent who is a
defendant voluntarily relinquished a child no more than one year old pursuant to this
section if:
(1) Expressing intent not to return for the child, the parent voluntarily delivered the
child safely to the physical custody of any of the following persons.
MO. REV. STAT. § 210.950 (2012). In addition, the North Dakota safe haven statute applies to
abandoned infants, which is defined as “a child who has been abandoned before reaching the
age of one year.” N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-02 (2012).
90

Hamlin, supra note 11, at 70.

91

The devastating effect safe haven laws can have on older children is illustrated with the
2008 passage of Nebraska’s safe haven law. Id. at 65. The sweeping legislation allowed for
children up to eighteen years of age to be abandoned in a safe haven, causing at least one
family to relinquish nine children from the ages of one to seventeen. Id. at 65, 77.
92

Bolling, supra note 7.

93

Id.

94

Sanger, supra note 1, at 769.

95

Bolling, supra note 7.

96

See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1303 (2010). Vermont’s Abandonment or Exposure of
Baby Statute provides:
(a) A person who abandons or exposes a child under the age of two years whereby the
life or health of such child is endangered shall be imprisoned not more than ten years
or fined not more than $10,000.00, or both.
(b)(1) It is not a violation of this section if a person voluntarily delivers a child not
more than 30 days of age to:
(A) An employee, staff member, or volunteer at a health care facility.
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4. Anonymity and Immunity for Mothers
The final two elements—anonymity and immunity—are especially important.
They provide desperate mothers with an incentive to take advantage of safe haven
laws.97 These elements are imperative if safe havens are to properly protect the lives
of children.98 Anonymity is particularly important because most women abandoning
their infants under safe haven laws do not wish for others to know of the baby. 99 As
of February 2011, a large majority of states expressly provide women with the right
to remain anonymous when relinquishing a child.100
Finally, immunity from prosecution allows a mother to abandon her child in a
safe place without fear of legal repercussions.101 Currently, twenty-two states allow a
mother to retain full immunity, meaning she cannot be charged with child abuse or
neglect.102 Sixteen states, while not providing full immunity, allow a parent to raise
safe relinquishment of a child as an affirmative defense under the statute in any child
abandonment or neglect proceedings.103
IV. OHIO’S SAFE HAVEN LAW
Following the lead from a number of other states, Ohio’s safe haven law was
implemented by the state legislature in 2001.104 Ohio was one of fifteen states across
the country to enact safe haven legislation in 2000, shortly after publicity surrounded
the Texas “baby Moses” law that began a national movement. 105 The Ohio General
Assembly passed House Bill 660 regarding “non-criminal child desertion” on
December 12, 2000, which went into effect in January, 2001.106 The bill was
sponsored by Representative Cheryl J. Winkler, a Republican from Hamilton

(B) An employee, staff member, or volunteer at a fire station, police station, place of
worship, or an entity that is licensed or authorized in this state to place minors for
adoption.
(C) A 911 emergency responder at a location where the responder and the person have
agreed to transfer the child.
(2) A person voluntarily delivering a child under this subsection shall not be required
to reveal any personally identifiable information, but may be offered the opportunity
to provide information concerning the child’s or family’s medical history.
Id.
97

Sanger, supra note 1, at 769.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Guttmacher Inst., supra note 38.

101

Bolling, supra note 7.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

OHIO JUV. L. § 29:12 (2011).

105

Bolling, supra note 7.

106

H.B. 660, 123rd Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2000).

2012]

REFORMING THE SAFE HAVEN IN OHIO

363

County.107 Like most other safe haven laws, Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.3516
only permits a parent to voluntarily leave a child in the custody of a hospital
employee, police officer, or medical worker at a fire station. 108 In terms of a standard
time limit, the statute was amended in 2008 to allow a child up to thirty-days old to
be surrendered.109 When the statute was originally enacted, only a child seventy-two
hours or younger could be relinquished to a safe haven. 110 The statute also indicates
that the mother who surrenders her child in accordance with the statute has an
absolute right to anonymity. 111 This means a mother may refuse to provide any
identifying information and may refuse to complete any and all medical forms. 112

107

Fiscal Note & Local Impact Statement, 123D GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF OHIO, http://ww
w.lsc.state.oh.us/fiscal/fiscalnotes/123ga/hb0660hr.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2011); Honoring
the Women Who Have Served in the Ohio Legislature, OHIO LADIES’ GALLERY, http://ohio
ladiesgallery.org/PublicOfficial.aspx?personId=108234 (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). During
her decade in office, Representative Winkler served as chair woman of the Family Services
House Committee and sat on the Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, the Children and
Youth Committee, and the Education, Colleges, and Universities Subcommittee. Id.
108

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.3516 (2010). This statute, entitled “Persons authorized to
take possession of a deserted child,” provides the specific requirements that must be met for
the relinquishment to qualify under the statute. The statute reads in full as follows:
[t]he following persons, while acting in an official capacity, shall take possession of a
child who is thirty days old or younger if that child’s parent has voluntarily delivered
the child to that person without the parent expressing an intent to return for the child.
(A) A peace officer on behalf of the law enforcement agency that
employs the officer;
(B) A hospital employee on behalf of the hospital that has granted
the person privilege to practice at the hospital or that employs the
person;
(C) An emergency medical service worker on behalf of the
emergency medical service organization that employs the worker or
for which the worker provides services.
Id.
109

Id.

110

Ludlow & Wilson, supra note 2. According to Senator Gary Cates, whose sponsorship
of the amendment helped it to be signed into law by former Governor Ted Strickland, the
change was necessary for Ohio to “reflect the national trend.” Price, supra note 4. Senators
hoped that the larger window of time would help save an even larger number of infants. Id.
111

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.3524 (2010).

112

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.3517 (2010). Section 2151.3517 specifies the duties and
responsibilities of individuals authorized to take possession of a relinquished infant. It also
details what the individuals are not authorized to make the mothers do at the time of
relinquishment:
(A) On taking possession of a child pursuant to section 2151.3516 of the Revised
Code, a law enforcement agency, hospital, or emergency medical service organization
shall do all the following:
(1) Perform any act necessary to protect the child’s health or safety;
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Finally, the Ohio statute allows for a mother to remain immune from criminal
prosecution, so long as the child does not appear to have suffered from any abuse or
neglect at the time he or she is surrendered.113
If a mother complied with all of the statutory requirements mentioned above, the
newly abandoned baby will be placed in the care of an individual authorized under
the statute to provide any necessary medical care.114 Additionally, this individual will
attempt to gather any medical history relevant to the child from the parent. 115 The
emergency medical worker must then notify children services that a baby was safely
relinquished.116 Upon such notification, children services consider the infant to be in
their custody and an investigation is opened. 117 Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code
(2) Notify the public children services agency of the county in which the agency,
hospital, or organization is located that the child has been taken into possession;
(3) If possible, make available to the parent who delivered the child forms developed
under section 2151.3529 of the Revised Code that are designed to gather medical
information concerning the child and the child’s parents;
(4) If possible, make available to the parent who delivered the child written materials
developed under section 2151.3529 of the Revised Code that describe services
available to assist parents and newborns;
(5) If the child has suffered a physical or mental wound, injury, disability, or condition
of a nature that reasonably indicates abuse or neglect of the child, attempt to identify
and pursue the person who delivered the child.
(B) An emergency medical services worker who takes possession of a child shall, in
addition to any act performed under division (A)(1) of this section, perform any
medical service the worker is authorized to perform that is necessary to protect the
physical health or safety of the child.
Id. Additionally, Section 2151.3525 details the procedure of completing medical information
forms by parents. It states specifically that:
A parent who voluntarily delivers a child under section 2151.3525 of the Revised
Code may complete all or any part of the medical information forms the parent
receives under division (A)(3) of section 2151.3517 of the Revised Code. The parent
may deliver the fully or partially completed forms at the same time as delivering the
child or at a later time. The parent is not required to complete all or any part of the
forms.
113

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.3523 (2010).

114

Ohio’s Safe Havens for Newborns: An Alternative to Leaving Infants in Unsafe Places,
OHIO DEP’T OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVS., http://www.odjfs.state.oh.us/forms/file.asp?id=1736&
type=application/pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2012); see OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.3517
(2010) (requiring the person taking possession of the child to “perform any act necessary to
protect the child’s health or safety); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.3518 (2010) (providing
that an authorized individual shall “provide temporary emergency care for the child . . .” and
“provide any care for the child that the public children services agency considers the best
interest of the child . . .”).
115

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.3517 (2010).

116

Id.

117

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.3518 (2010) (providing that among other duties, the
public children services agencies are required to “make an investigation concerning the child”
and “prepare and keep written records of the investigation of the child, of the care and
treatment afforded the child, and any other records required by the department of job and
family services”).

2012]

REFORMING THE SAFE HAVEN IN OHIO

365

Section 2151.3518, a motion is then filed with the juvenile court in the county where
the child is relinquished.118 Upon filing the motion, the statute requires a hearing to
be held as soon as possible, 119 and the county court must provide the child’s parents
with notice of the hearing. 120 The statute further states, however, that the court need
only provide notice to the parents if they have knowledge of their names.121 In
addition to this implicit anonymity provision, the Ohio Revised Code also explicitly
grants the right to anonymity under section 2151.3524.122 But any parent who
relinquishes a child pursuant to the statutory requirements forfeits anonymity if that
child appears to have suffered from any physical abuse or neglect. 123
In conjunction with the anonymity provision provided by section 2151.3524, the
Ohio Revised Code also ensures that the mother relinquishing her child will not face
any criminal sanctions for simply dropping off her baby in a designated safe haven
zone—an action that, without the statutory safeguards, would be considered child
abandonment.124 Much like the forfeiture of the anonymity requirement, a mother

118

Id. (requiring the public child services agency to “[f]ile a motion with the juvenile court
of the county in which the agency is located requesting that the court grant temporary custody
of the child to the agency or to a private child placing agency”).
119
OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.3519 (2010) (stating that “when a public children
services agency files a motion pursuant to division (E) of section 2151.3518 of the Revised
Code, the juvenile court shall hold an emergency hearing as soon as possible to determine
whether the child is a deserted child”).
120

Id. The court is required to give notice to the parents of the child only if the court has
knowledge of the names of the parents. Id. If the court determines at the initial hearing or at
any other hearing that a child is a deserted child, the court shall adjudicate the child a deserted
child and enter its findings in the record of the case. Id.
121

See id. (“The court is required to give notice to the parents of the child only if the court
knows the names of the parents.”).
122

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.3524 (2010). This statute, dealing with the parental right
to anonymity specifically states that “[a] parent who voluntarily delivers their child under
section 2151.3516 of the Revised Code has the absolute right to remain anonymous . . . [a]
parent who voluntarily delivers a child may leave the place at which the parent delivers the
child at any time after the delivery of the child.”
123

Id. (“[A] parent who delivers or attempts to deliver a child who has suffered any
physical or mental wound, injury, disability, or condition of a nature that reasonably indicates
abuse or neglect of the child does not have the right to remain anonymous . . .”).
124
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.3523 (2010). This statute provides for immunity from
criminal liability when a child is relinquished per the statutory requirements, stating:

(A) A parent does not commit a criminal offense under the laws of this state and shall
not be subject to criminal prosecution in this state for the act of voluntarily delivering
a child under section 2151.3516 of the Revised Code
(B) A person who delivers or attempts to deliver a child who has suffered any physical
or mental wound, injury, disability, or condition of a nature that reasonably indicates
abuse or neglect of the child is not immune from civil or criminal liability for abuse or
neglect.
Id.
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loses her right to immunity if emergency medical workers receive a child showing
signs of abuse or neglect.125
If all the statute’s elements are met, the court must determine whether the child is
a “deserted child” under the statute. 126 The standard for “deserted child” is easily met
if the child was voluntarily delivered to an authorized individual with no intent to
return for the child at a later time.127 If the court finds that the child meets this
standard, the court places the child into the temporary custody of child and family
services.128 The hope is that a family will adopt the child, achieving what the statute
set out to accomplish.129
V. THE CONFLICT FOUND IN IN RE BABY BOY DOE
A. Statute of “No Further Force and Effect”
Despite the role of Ohio’s safe haven statutes in protecting the safety of infants
and ensuring the anonymity of mothers too frightened to reveal their identity to
authorities, the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court ruled the provisions
unconstitutional on November 8, 2007.130 In In re Baby Boy Doe, the court held the
safe haven law in Ohio, known as the Child Desertion Act, to be of “no further force
and effect.”131 In this case, a child was properly surrendered in accordance with the
safe haven statute and at the time of the surrender, the infant’s mother, acted within
her rights by refusing to provide the emergency medical worker with identifying
information.132 Although the court acknowledged the legislature’s intent to allow
mothers who surrender their children under this statute to remain anonymous, it held
that this intent conflicts with two Juvenile Procedural Rules: 15(A) and 2(Y). 133
Juvenile Procedural Rule 15(A) requires that once a complaint is filed in juvenile
court, the clerk must issue a summons to the parties to attend a hearing. 134
125

Id.

126

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.3515(A) (2010).

127

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.3515 (2010) (defining a deserted child as “a child whose
parent has voluntarily delivered the child to an emergency medical service worker, peace
officer, or hospital employee without expressing an intent to return for the child”).
128

12 OHIO JUV. § 29 (2011).

129

OHIO DEPT. OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, supra note 62.

130

In re Baby Boy Doe, 880 N.E.2d 989, 991 (Ohio C.P. 2007).

131

Id.

132

Id. at 990.

133

Id. at 991.

134

Id. Juvenile Rule 15(A) details the process in which a summons must be issued:

(A) After the complaint has been filed, the court shall cause the issuance of a
summons directed to the child, the parents, guardian, custodian, and any other persons
who appear to the court to be proper or necessary parties. The summons shall require
the parties to appear before the court at the time fixed to answer the allegations of the
complaint. A child alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent shall not be
summoned unless the court so directs.
OHIO JUV. R. 15(A) (2010).
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Furthermore, Juvenile Rule 2(Y), setting forth the definition of who must be notified
of the hearing, requires notification of the parents of any child involved in a juvenile
court proceeding.135
B. Ohio Constitutional Rules of Construction Under Article IV
The In re Baby Boy Doe court further articulated that under Article IV of the
Ohio Constitution, when a statute conflicts with a procedural rule, the procedural
rule controls.136 The court held that “[t]he issuance of notice for court proceedings is
procedural as it pertains to the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress rather
than creating, defining or regulating the rights of parties.” 137 Therefore, while the
court admitted that that underlying purpose of Ohio’s safe haven statute is to provide
for the anonymity of the mother, it found that requiring the parent surrendering the
child to comply with Juvenile Rules 15(A) and 2(Y) would “undermine the very
purpose of the statute.”138 The court seemed to recognize the importance of the
anonymity requirement and in no way intended to strike down the safe haven law for
moral or substantive reasons: the statute was struck down only because it conflicted
with the rules.139
C. Ramifications of In re Baby Boy Doe
This 2007 Cuyahoga Common Pleas Court decision was never appealed.
Similarly, no other controlling court, including the Ohio Supreme Court, ever
decided the conflict between Juvenile Rules 15(A) and 2(Y) and Ohio’s safe haven
statute.140 Since 2003, however, eight cases were filed under the Deserted Child Act
135

Baby Boy Doe, 880 N.E.2d at 991. Juvenile Rule 2(Y) provides the definition of “party”
to be used throughout the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure:
(Y) “Party” means a child who is the subject of a juvenile court proceeding, the
child’s spouse, if any, the child’s parent or parents, or if the parent of a child is a child,
the parent of that parent, in appropriate cases, the child’s custodian, guardian, or
guardian ad litem, the state and any other person specifically designated by the court.
OHIO JUV. R. 2(Y) (2010).
136

Baby Boy Doe, 880 N.E.2d at 991. Article IV, Section 5(B) details the powers of the
Ohio Supreme Court. It provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall prescribe rules governing
practice and procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or
modify any substantive right . . . [A]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further
force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5(B).
137

Baby Boy Doe, 880 N.E.2d at 991; see also Krause v. State, 285 N.E.2d 736, 744 (Ohio
1972) (explaining that substantive law, on the other hand, “creates, defines and regulates the
rights of the parties”); Alexander v. Buckeye Pipeline Co., 359 N.E.2d 702, 703 (Ohio 1977)
(discussing another procedural rule, Civ. R. 54(B)).
138

Baby Boy Doe, 880 N.E.2d at 991.

139

Id.

140

While no Ohio court has specifically dealt with the issues at hand, the Ohio Court of
Appeals heard another constitutional challenge to the state safe haven statute. Ohio v. Smith,
No. 04AP-1321, 2005 WL 1394779, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 2005). But the court found
that the public citizen who brought the challenge against the Ohio Department of Job and
Family Services did not have the requisite standing because he did not have a personal “stake
in the outcome of the controversy.” Id. at *1, *3. The appellant claimed that while he was not
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in Cuyahoga County alone.141 Therefore, it seems as though the safe haven statute, at
least in Cuyahoga County, operated unconstitutionally for the past three years.
According to Magistrate Patricia Yeomans Salvador, any case filed with the
Honorable Judge Peter M. Sikora of the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County
Common Pleas Court—who ruled the anonymity provision of the Ohio safe haven
statute unconstitutional—must be amended and filed as a neglected or abused baby
under section 2151.353 of the Ohio Revised Code. 142 Magistrate Salvador further
articulated that the practical effect of filing under section 2151.35, as opposed to the
safe haven statute, is very similar to cases where the court cannot ascertain the
mother’s identity; but in instances where the mother gave birth in a hospital and left
a record of her name, she would be served with a notice of the hearing regarding her
deserted child.143
The majority of baby abandonment cases in Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court
involve mothers delivering their baby at a hospital with no intention of taking the
baby home.144 This may mean that a majority of women in Cuyahoga County who
are legally in compliance with the statute will potentially be barred from seeking the
protection of one of its most important provisions—anonymity—and will ultimately
have their identities processed through Ohio’s judicial system. While In re Baby Boy
Doe does not immediately impact the status of the safe haven law statewide, it does
represent a future danger to the statute’s long-term viability. This same reasoning
could easily be employed by the Ohio Supreme Court to hold that Ohio’s safe haven
statute is unconstitutional statewide.
personally injured by the legislation at issue, the Deserted Child Act “has harmed, and will
continue to harm, non-relinquishing parents and children by denying them their constitutional
rights to notice in proceedings affecting their parental rights.” Id. at *2. He argued that he was
therefore permitted to bring his claim not because of a personal stake in the outcome, but
based on the “public action” or “public right” doctrine. Id.
141

E-mail from James Farrell, Sys. Analyst, Cuyahoga Cnty. C.P. Ct., Juv. Div., to Mag.
Patricia Yeomans Salvador and forwarded to author (Feb. 7, 2011) (on file with author). Two
cases were filed under Ohio Revised Code section 2151.3516 in 2003; one was filed in 2004,
there were no filings in 2005, and another case was filed in 2006. Id. In 2007, two more cases
were filed, and one was filed each year in both 2008 and 2009. Id.
142
Interview with Patricia Yeomans Salvador, Magistrate and Referee in the Cuyahoga
Cnty. C.P. Ct., Juv. Div. and Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law (Feb. 3,
2011).
143

Id. Where the safe haven statute was ruled unconstitutional, the case is treated as that of
an abused or neglected child under the language of section 2151.353 of the Ohio Revised
Code. It reads in pertinent part:
(A) If a child is adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child, the court may
make any of the following orders of disposition:
(1) Place the child in protective supervision;
(2) Commit the child to the temporary custody of a public children services agency, a
private child placing agency, either parent, a relative residing within or outside the
state, or a probation officer for placement in a certified foster home, or in any other
home approved by the court . . .
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353 (2010).
144

Interview with Patricia Yeomans Salvador, supra note 142.
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VI. IMPORTANCE OF THE ANONYMITY REQUIREMENT
While the importance of anonymity has been recognized since the inception of
safe haven laws throughout the country, states continue to value the vital role that
anonymity plays in protecting the lives of infants. Allowing women to remain
anonymous creates an incentive great enough for guilty and panicked women to
choose safely relinquishing their babies over continuing to hide the pregnancy and
birth.145 Without the guarantee of anonymity, many new mothers may feel too
frightened to bring their baby to a safe haven, thereby increasing the number of
infant deaths each year.146 These women are more likely to choose a safe option if
they no longer face social stigmatization within in their families and communities. 147
A. The Myth of the Maternal Instinct
While infant death at the hands of mothers is a shocking societal phenomenon, it
is most certainly not new. For example, during a time of war and poverty in the
1930s, nearly thirty-eight percent of infants born in a three-year period in one
Bolivian village were killed by their mothers. 148 The fact that safe haven laws
generally continue to be directed at young mothers may be limited to the fact that
when women commit murder, the victim is most likely to be their own infant
child.149 According to one researcher, the traditional concept of the “maternal
instinct” that instantly makes any woman bond with her baby, regardless of her
thoughts on her pregnancy, does not exist. 150 This means that the desire to nurture
her infant does not come naturally; rather, it comes from preparation and the
ambition to be a caring and nurturing mother. 151 That is, “perhaps it comforts us to
believe that anyone who violates the sacred mother-child bond is simply crazy; it
would be unimaginable if these mothers were making rational criminal choices.” 152
Illness does not seem to provide the full answer, however, as women seem to
145

See Sanger, supra note 1.

146

See id.

147

Id. at 771.

148

Susan Caba, She Loves Me, She Loves Me Not, SALON, Dec. 9, 1999, http://www.salon.c
om/mwt/feature/1999/12/09/maternal. While the Bolivian village provides a modern example
of almost systematic infanticide and neonaticide, this is by no means the only example. As
Michelle Oberman points out:
There is every reason to believe that infanticide is as old as human society itself and
that no culture has been immune to it. Infanticide was legal throughout the ancient
civilizations of Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome, and was justified by reasons ranging
from population control to eugenics to illegitimacy. Although Constantine declared
infanticide a crime in 318 A.D., all indications are that throughout much of the history
of Western civilization, infanticide remained commonplace.
Oberman, supra note 13, at 6.
149

Caba, supra note 148.

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Dahlia Lithwick, When Parents Kill, SLATE, Mar. 12, 2002, http://www.slate.com/form
atdynamics/CleanPrintProxy.aspx?129677.
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disproportionately react violently toward their own children. 153 While it may be hard
to accept that a mother’s love is not always unconditional, society can no longer
continue to rely on a mythical force or bond of love that a mother is supposed to
have for her child to prevent infant deaths. By providing the opportunity for women
to anonymously leave their child in a designated safe haven, mothers are able to be
relieved of any guilt they may feel for not conforming to societal norms and
conventions of motherhood.
B. Retaining the Protections Afforded Under Roe v. Wade
Allowing women to remain anonymous also supports the significant right that
women have regarding their fertility. By establishing a framework for a
constitutionally protected right to privacy both within the home and within oneself,
the United States Supreme Court provided women with the right to reproductive
privacy.154 In the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a “zone of privacy” which included the right for
a woman to choose to terminate her own pregnancy. 155 The Court reasoned that
while the state has a compelling interest in protecting the life of the unborn fetus,
which increases as birth approaches, there is also “an important and legitimate
interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman.” 156
Therefore, the Court determined for the first time that a woman’s right to assert
control over her body, including choosing an abortion, was protected under the
Constitution.157 Much like Roe protects the right to have an abortion, a woman’s
right to safely surrender her baby to medical experts, without another individual
interfering with her decision, is crucial in a woman maintaining her due process right
to privacy.
1. A Recent Trend Toward Restriction
There is no doubt that Roe began a new era of choice, but it also represented a
shift toward greater gender equality and respect for women dealing with
unintentional pregnancies.158 According to Sarah Weddington, the lawyer who

153

Id. Additionally, the popularly held view that women who commit infanticide and
neoinfanticide because they are crazy and delusional does not explain why we view men who
do the same thing as simply criminal. Id. Lithwick argues that this anomaly may be due to the
fact that “[w]e still view children as the mother’s property. Since destroying one’s own
property is considered crazy while destroying someone else’s property is criminal, women
who murder their own children are sent to hospitals, whereas their husbands are criminals,
who go to jail or the electric chair.” Id.
154
Gina K. Robeen, Laws Like White Elephants: Sterilization of the Right to Privacy, 46
SMU L. REV. 57, 65 (1992).
155

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).

156

Id. at 162.

157
Robeen, supra note 154, at 65. In addition to Roe v. Wade, a “women’s right to life, to
control over their own bodies, and to freedom and privacy in matters relating to sex and
procreation” is protected. Id. (citing Doe v. Scott, 321 F.Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971)).
158
Jenny Hontz, 25 Years Later: The Impact of Roe v. Wade, HUM. RTS. 8 (1998) (“[Roe
has] allowed women to have healthier children, and it’s given women the practical
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presented the Roe oral argument before the Supreme Court, “[n]othing determines
the course of women’s lives more than the spacing and timing of her children.” 159
Much like the decision to terminate a pregnancy, the decision not to raise a child is
highly personal and private. 160 Retaining the right to anonymity for mothers taking
advantage of safe haven statutes is just as essential as protecting the right to choose
abortion that women were granted under the Court’s expansive “zone of privacy.” 161
Additionally, the importance of maintaining options 162 for women facing the
hardships of an unwanted or unexpected pregnancy only seems greater given the
slow, yet steady measures the Court has taken since Roe to whittle away at the broad
right granted to women.163 Unfortunately, extreme measures taken by pro-life
activists seem to be on the rise, especially given the political scene after the
November 2010 elections established a Republican majority in the House of
Representatives.164 According to House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, the situation
for women regarding access to abortions is not only very real, but very dangerous as
well.165 While there is reason to be hopeful that some of the more extreme 166
wherewithal to pursue their dreams and aspirations without fear of pregnancy shattering those
dreams. By its very philosophy, Roe underscores the equality of women.”)
159

Id.

160

This can be inferred from various U.S. Supreme Court holdings: Roe, 410 U.S. at 153
(“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (concluding that a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives
was unconstitutional and violated the right to marital privacy).
161

Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.

162

See generally Ayres, supra note 77, at 234-35. According to legal scholar Susan Ayres,
safe haven laws offer an important option to women faced with an unwanted pregnancy. Id.
Ayres argues that many other legal scholars only analyzed the effectiveness of safe havens in
relation to a “culture of life,” forcing critics to say they the laws are really just a tool of the
pro-life movement. Id. But Ayres focuses on the concept of “kairos,” which she describes as
“right-timing” when it comes to safe haven laws. Id. According to Ayres, “responses to
unwanted pregnancy are kairic, in the sense that safe havens should not be viewed as the only
solution to the problem of concealed pregnancies and dumpster babies, but as one possible
solution.” Id.
163

Hontz, supra note 158, at 10. For example, since Planned Parenthood of Southern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992), the Court has upheld additional restrictions on
abortions such as mandatory waiting periods and parental consent for minors. Id.
164
Amanda Terkel, Nancy Pelosi: Women’s Rights Face Greatest Threat “In Our
Lifetime”, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/10/
nancy-pelosi-womens-rights-threatened_n_821536.html.
165

Id. Representative Pelosi is quoted as saying that some of the legislation currently being
proposed by anti-choice lawmakers is “[d]angerous to women’s health, disrespects the
judgment of American women . . . and its the most comprehensive and radical assault on
women’s health in our lifetime. It’s that bad.” Id.
166
Id. For example, House Bill 3, entitled “No Taxpayer Funding For Abortion Act,” has
been introduced by Republican Representative Chris Smith. Id. The bill seeks to “deny any
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legislation will not be passed, safe haven laws (and their anonymity provisions) may
assume an even more vital role in women’s health care. If access continues to be
limited, more women who do not want to face public scrutiny or familial shame that
accompanies traditional birth and adoption may be forced to relinquish their child
under the safe haven law. Thus, anonymity remains demonstrably necessary as a
means of safeguarding what could become the last remaining legal protection for
frightened pregnant women.
C. Situational Circumstances
A woman may choose to surrender her child for a number of different reasons,
many of which she has no control over, including a breakdown of her own family
structure or the absence of her unborn child’s father. 167 Infant abandonment is a
much larger social problem that goes beyond the scope of a mother leaving her child
in a safe location to be put up for adoption. Therefore, women should not be
burdened with the entirety of the blame for choosing to take advantage of a law
crafted to protect the child and be forced to identify themselves to safe haven
authorities. For example, legal scholar Michelle Oberman argues that a:
profound commonality linking contemporary cases emerges when one
focuses on the perpetrator’s life circumstances at the time of her act. At
the most basic level, maternal filicide is a crime committed by mothers,
tax credits and benefits to employers who offer health insurance to their staff if that coverage
includes abortion access”—a measure that seems unnecessary given the fact that federal
money is already barred from being used to pay for abortions. Id. H.R. 3, which was
introduced on January 20, 2011, reads in pertinent part:
Sec. 301. Prohibition on Funding for Abortions
No funds authorized or appropriated by Federal law, and none of the funds in any trust
fund to which funds are authorized or appropriated by Federal law, shall be expended
for any abortion.
Sec. 302. Prohibition on Funding for Health Benefit Plans that Cover Abortion.
None of the funds authorized or appropriated by Federal law, and none of the funds in
any trust fund to which funds are authorized or appropriated by Federal law, shall be
expended for health benefits coverage that includes coverage of abortion.
Sec. 303. Prohibition on Tax Benefits Relating to Abortion
For taxable years beginning after the date of the enactment of this section—
(1) no credit shall be allowed under the internal revenue laws with respect to amounts
paid or incurred for an abortion or with respect to amounts paid or incurred for a
health benefits plan (including premium assistance) that includes coverage of
abortion,
(2) for purposes of determining any deduction for expenses paid for medical care of
the taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse or dependents, amounts paid or incurred for an
abortion or for a health benefits plan that includes coverage of abortion shall not be
taken into account, and
(3) in the case of any tax-preferred trust or account the purpose of which is to pay
medical expenses of the account beneficiary, any amount paid or distributed from
such an account for an abortion shall be included in the gross income of such
beneficiary.
No Taxpayer Funding For Abortion Act, H.R. 3, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h112-3.
167

Sanger, supra note 1, at 797.
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against their own children, and therefore is, by definition, a reflection on
the individual mother’s experience of the conditions under which she was
expected to raise her child.168
Therefore, it is the responsibility of state and local legislatures to step in and help
create a solution for women who may be struggling “under the circumstances
dictated by their particular position in place and time.” 169
D. Legislative Intent for Anonymity
Finally, the legislative intent behind Ohio’s safe haven law is clear: provide
mothers anonymity in exchange for the safe hand-over of infants that they are not
able to or willing to raise and support.170 Not only does the court in In re Baby Doe
clearly identify this intent, but the original analysis of House Bill 660—which
eventually led to the 2001 statute—outlines the same intention.171 The General
Assembly clearly stated that the statute “provides that the parent has the absolute
right to remain anonymous.”172 This indicates that the legislature recognized that this
was the best solution to solving the societal issue of infant abandonment throughout
the state. But the state legislature was also well aware of the expansive privilege that
this absolute right granted. Therefore, it indicated that a mother forfeits this right if a
child is brought to the safe haven showing signs of abuse or neglect. 173 This seems to
illustrate that, had the general assembly not truly desired for a general and absolute
anonymity provision, they would not have included this exception. Other states, like
California, have recognized that while anonymity is provided for each mother with
certainty, there is also a valid reason to make a good faith effort to obtain the
mother’s medical history.174 Therefore, while California still allows for mothers to

168

Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Cross-Cultural Patterns in and Perspectives on
Contemporary Maternal Filicide, 26 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 493, 493 (2003).
169

Id at 494, 499-500.

170

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.3524 (2010).

171

Baby Boy Doe, 880 N.E.2d at 991 (“the underlying purpose of the deserted-child statute
. . . is to protect the anonymity of the parents who desert a child and to give them immunity
from criminal prosecution.”); Fiscal Note & Local Impact Statement, 123rd General Assembly
of Ohio, http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/fiscal/fiscalnotes/123ga/hb0660hr.htm (last visited Feb.
12, 2011) (“The bill allows for mothers to give up their newborn babies 72 hours or younger
to police, paramedics, or emergency room employees in an anonymous manner . . . Any
parent who drops off a newborn at a designated location does not commit a criminal offense
and may not be subject to criminal prosecution for the act.”).
172

Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.3524 (2010).

173

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.3524 (2010).

174

The California safe haven statute details the good faith effort to be made by individuals
receiving infants under the safe haven law:
(2) Provides, or makes a good faith effort to provide, to the parent or other individual
surrendering the child a copy of a unique, coded, confidential ankle bracelet
identification in order to facilitate reclaiming the child pursuant to subdivision (f).
However, possession of the ankle bracelet identification, in and of itself, does not
establish parentage or a right to custody of the child.
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choose absolute anonymity in exchange for the safe hand-over of infants, the
legislature indicated that exceptions can be made for information regarding the
mother and the baby’s health.175 Additionally, states that already provide for
anonymous abandonments under safe haven laws do not treat the situation lightly. 176
That is, it is not seen as simply a form of temporary foster care for mothers who do
not “feel like” raising their child for the time being; rather, it requires the mother to
relinquish all parental rights and responsibilities permanently. 177
VII. CRITICISM SURROUNDING SAFE HAVEN LAWS
A. Paternal Rights
While the benefits of safe haven laws, especially the anonymity requirement,
seem clear, there are a number of valid criticisms presented by legal scholars and
advocates of child welfare. For example, there is a widely held criticism attacking
safe haven laws from the vantage point of paternal rights, arguing that allowing a
woman to abandon her child without the father’s consent violates his due process
and his claim to parental rights.178 Constitutional arguments regarding the rights of
fathers are closely akin to the anonymity provisions found in most state’s safe haven
laws.179 That is, by affording women the opportunity to take advantage of a safe
haven statute without anyone’s knowledge, fathers do not have the opportunity to
contest the relinquishment or offer to provide custody in place of the mother. 180 One
(3) Provides, or makes a good faith effort to provide, to the parent or other individual
surrendering the child a medical information questionnaire, which may be declined,
voluntarily filled out and returned at the time the child is surrendered, or later filled
out and mailed in the envelope provided for this purpose. This medical information
questionnaire shall not require identifying information about the child or the parent or
individual surrendering the child, other than the identification code provided in the
ankle bracelet placed on the child. Every questionnaire provided pursuant to this
section shall begin with the following notice in no less than 12-point type:
Notice: The baby you have brought in today may have serious medical needs in the
future that we don’t know about today. Some illnesses, including cancer are best
treated when we know about family medical histories. In addition, sometimes relatives
are needed for life-saving treatments. To make sure this baby will have a healthy
future, your assistance in completing this questionnaire fully is essential. Thank you.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.7 (2010) (emphasis omitted).
175

According to the State of California’s report to the legislature regarding the Safely
Surrendered Baby Law, of the fifty-two infants that were surrendered during the statutes first
four years, only three medical questionnaires were filled out by relinquishing parents. Safely
Surrendered Baby Laws (SSB): Report to the Legislature, 2004-2005 Sess. (Cal. 2005),
available at http://www.babysafe.ca.gov/res/pdf/FinalSSBReporttoLeg4.pdf.
176

Sanger, supra note 1, at 766.

177

Id.

178
Jeffrey A. Parness, Lost Paternity in the Culture of Motherhood: A Different View of
Safe Haven, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 81, 84-85 (2007).
179

Dayna R. Cooper, Fathers Are Parents Too: Challenging Safe Haven Laws With
Procedural Due Process, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 877, 882-83, 885 (2003).
180

Id.
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scholar argues that the entire validity of the scheme of safe haven laws turns on the
“father’s rights regarding notice of termination of parental rights proceedings . . .
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment encompasses a parent’s liberty interest in the custody,
care, and control of their children.”181
Currently, only twelve states explicitly provide a procedure in the safe haven
statute to protect a father’s right. 182 On the other hand, thirty-three states do not offer
any guidance on paternal notification or do not require that the father be notified. 183
Most commonly, however, statutes are simply silent on the matter. 184 Of states that
offer provisions to notify fathers, there are two different types of procedures. 185 First,
some states require notice through publication or media; that is, the abandoned baby
must be reported in a local newspaper or on the local television station. 186 Second,
some legislatures may require a search of the putative father registry when a baby is
abandoned under a safe haven statute. 187 There is also the fear that even when
paternal rights are established within the statutory framework, state welfare agencies
may have little incentive to do so, given that women are encouraged to anonymously
relinquish their children.188 Despite the concerns regarding a father’s paternity right,
the consequences of safe haven statutes that do not seek to limit participation to
mothers could be even more disastrous. 189 Therefore, it seems appropriate to argue
that while fathers may have a stake in cases of infant abandonment, the incentive to
provide anonymity far outweighs this if it can help prevent the cases of infanticide
and neonanticide each year.
B. Hindrance to an Open Adoption Process
Many proponents of safe haven laws recognize that these laws not only save
infant lives, but they also make more infants available for adoption; but not all
proponents agree.190 Given the right of women in a majority of states to remain
anonymous and not provide any identifying information about herself or her infant,
some adoption advocates argue that it encouraged “a significant setback for adoption
policy that disadvantages children by permanently denying them any sense of
personal identity or even a way to trace their medical history.” 191 As more adoption
181

Id. at 885.

182

Bolling, supra note 7.

183

Id.

184

Id.

185

Id.

186

Id.

187

Id. Putative father registries allow heterosexual men who are at risk for fathering a child
to register with the state to safeguard their paternity rights. Parness, supra note 178, at 92. But
the system to ensure paternal rights seems flawed in that women are never required to notify
the birth father and men who do come forward asserting their rights have no recourse should
the mother lie to them regarding the paternity of their child. Id.
188

Dailard, supra note 30, at 2.

189

Donnelly, supra note 40, at 785.

190

Dailard, supra note 30, at 2.

191

Id.
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agencies are encouraging both adoptive parents and children to share birth
information, safe haven laws are seen as a setback to the open process currently
advocated.192 Not only does anonymity complicate the practicalities of open
adoptions, according to the executive director of Voice for Adoption, a national
adoption advocacy organization, it has a harmful emotional and mental affect on
adopted children.193
VIII. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO JUVENILE RULE 1(C)
Potential conflicts arising from the safe haven statutes undoubtedly differ
depending on each state’s specific procedural and constitutional requirements. This
has prompted many child welfare experts to note that states’ safe haven laws are
often passed without conducting a thorough analysis of the existing legal protections
afforded to women and children, inevitably leading to challenges through the
courts.194 The anonymity requirement in particular has traditionally created
difficulties, as there is the potential that the due process rights of the mothers could
be violated.195 Therefore, for the abandoned child to legally be put up for adoption,
courts are often required to hold hearings explicitly terminating these rights in which
the mother and or father are named parties. 196 Due to the unique nature of safe haven
statutes and juvenile rules in general, however, reform has, and should continue to
be, tailored to meet the individual needs of each state. 197
After the ruling in In re Baby Boy Doe, for Ohio’s safe haven statute to retain
maternal anonymity, Juvenile Rule 1(C) needs to be amended. This rule, working in
conjunction with Rules 15(A) and 2(Y), provides for various juvenile procedural rule
exceptions.198 The rule, in full, states:
1(C) Exceptions: These rules shall not apply to procedure (1) Upon appeal
to review any judgment, order, or ruling; (2) Upon the trial of criminal
actions; (3) Upon the trial of actions for divorce, annulment, legal
separation, and related proceedings; (4) In proceedings to determine
parent-child relationships, provided, however that appointment of counsel
shall be in accordance with Rule 4(A) of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure;
(5) In the commitment of the mentally ill and mentally retarded; (6) In
proceedings under section 2151.85 of the Revised Code to the extent that
there is a conflict between these rules and section 2151.85 of the Revised
Code.199
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This Note calls on the Ohio State Supreme Court200 to amend Rule 1(C) by
adding an additional provision to the already listed exceptions. It calls for an
insertion of the phrase “(5) In proceedings in accordance with sections 2151.3515
through 2551.3530, where it has been determined that the right to notification has
been waived by the parent.” This amendment would allow the safe haven statute to
be uniformly applied throughout the state by ensuring its constitutionality in
Cuyahoga County. It would also protect the statute from future litigation that may
arise regarding the constitutionality of the safe haven’s anonymity provision; an
amendment would firmly establish an exception to the notice requirement when
filing under the safe haven statute. The original section 6, which is now section 7,
already provides for an exception when there is a conflict between a juvenile rule
and another state statute requiring the summoning of a child’s parents. 201 Therefore,
this proposed amendment would not disrupt the rule’s original meaning and intent,
as it simply allows for the conflict between the procedural requirement and the
anonymity requirement to be explicitly resolved through an exception.

200

Under Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio State Constitution, the Supreme Court has
the power to propose amendments the governing rules of the state. It provides that:
(B) The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all
courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right. Proposed rules shall be filed by the court, not later than the fifteenth day of
January, with the clerk of each house of the General Assembly during a regular
session thereof, and amendments to any such proposed rules may be so filed not later
than the first day of May in that session. Such rules shall take effect on the following
first day of July, unless prior to such day the General Assembly adopts a concurrent
resolution of disapproval. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further
force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
Courts may adopt additional rules concerning local practice in their respective courts
which are not inconsistent with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court may make rules to require uniform record keeping for all courts of the
state, and shall make rules governing the admission to the practice of law and
discipline of persons so admitted.
Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5(B), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/constitution.cfm?
Part=4&ExpandSections=Yes. The Supreme Court then files the final language of the
proposed amendment to the Ohio General Assembly for passage. See, e.g., Supreme Court
Submits “Open Discovery,” Other Amendment Rules of Practice and Procedure, SUPREME
COURT OF OHIO & OHIO JUDICIAL SYSTEM (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.ohi
o.gov/PIO/news/2010/ ruleAmend_042810.asp.
201
OHIO JUV. R 1(C) (2010). According to the Editor’s Comment to Rule 1(C), it is
considered:

both a rule of exclusion and inclusion. The rule states the general exclusions from
applicability but also by stating “When any statute provides for procedure by general
or specific reference to the statutes governing procedure in juvenile court actions such
procedure shall be in accordance with these rules” it becomes a rule of inclusion. The
Juvenile Rules apply not only because of this provision but also because Ohio
Constitutional Article IV, § 5(B) states “all laws in conflict with such rules shall be of
no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
Id.
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While amending the state’s juvenile rules to allow for anonymity to remain a part
of Ohio’s safe haven statute may seem like a drastic measure, many states already
provided for specific exceptions similar to the statute’s proposal.202 Twenty states
already addressed the problem that arises between anonymity requirements and
parental notification.203 State statutes generally provide for one of two different
methods to avoid this conflict. 204 For one, the state can consider the act of voluntarily
relinquishing the infant to be all the “notice” that is required for a termination of
rights.205 That is, in states like Florida, it is presumed that when mothers leave their
infant at a designated safe haven they are consenting to terminating all parental
rights to the child.206 On the other hand, some states retain the anonymity element by
allowing for a very broad interpretation of the notice requirement under its
procedural rules.207 For example, in South Carolina, Social Services are permitted to
merely publish notification of an abandoned infant in local newspapers and
broadcast on local televisions stations. 208 Under the proposed amendment to Rule
1(C), Ohio’s system would be more reflective of Florida’s current law, as it would
presume an intention to relinquish the parental rights and do away with the notice
requirement so long as the child was relinquished pursuant to any statutory
requirements.
IX. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it seems clear that Ohio needs to act with urgency to protect the
viability of its safe haven statute. As societal pressures on women continue to
evolve, and constitutional protections regarding a woman’s freedom of choice hang
precariously in the balance, safe havens may come to have an even more crucial role
202

Carrubba, supra note 31, at 71.

203

Williams-Mbengue, supra note 37.
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Id. The Florida Statute § 383.50, Treatment of Surrendered Newborn Infants, states that
“[t]here is a presumption that the parent who leaves the newborn infant in accordance with
this section intended to leave the newborn infant and consented to termination of parental
rights.” FLA. STAT. ANN § 383.50 (2010).
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See, e.g., id.

208

Id. The South Carolina Statute provides that:

Within forty-eight hours after taking legal custody of the infant, the department shall
publish notice, in a newspaper of general circulation in the area where the safe haven
that initially took the infant is located, and send a news release to broadcast and print
media in the area. The notice and the news release must state the circumstances under
which the infant was left at the safe haven, a description of the infant, and the date,
time, and place of the permanency planning hearing provided for in subsection (E)(2).
The notice and the news release must also state that any person wishing to assert
parental rights in regard to the infant must do so at the hearing. If the person leaving
the infant identified anyone as being a parent of the infant, the notice must be sent by
certified mail to the last known address of the person identified as a parent at least two
weeks prior to the hearing.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-40 (2010).
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in protecting the lives of newborn infants. Additionally, once society recognizes the
unfortunate reality that women can, and often times do, pose a threat to their own
offspring, more directed measures, like safe haven legislation, can be used in an
attempt to solve the problem. 209 State leaders must continue to educate young girls
and their families on the dangers of a concealed birth, informing them that safe
havens are available to help. Without the protections of guaranteed anonymity and
immunity, many young girls may fear the possible shame and ridicule too much to
deal with their unfortunate reality and the consequences of this denial. 210
The success stemming from safe havens since the late 1990s requires a continued
dedication to the proven elements of anonymity and immunity that make up the laws
today and the security they provide to frightened mothers. 211 As safe haven statutes
continue to gain prevalence throughout the country, state courts nationwide will
likely see an increase in challenges against these statutes and an increase in mothers
prosecuted for trying to protect their child. 212 The hope is that the increased statutory
protection of anonymity that the amended Rule 1(C) provides women, will allow
Ohio to continually provide for the safe and lawful abandonment of children; even
one additional life saved makes the entire regulatory scheme worthwhile. 213
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